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CASE SUMMARIES
reviewing the FTC's findings would be the highly deferential sub-
stantial evidence test because the findings required resolution of
extremely complex and technical factual issues, and the question
of whether an advertisement is deceptive was more "akin to a find-
ing of fact than a conclusion of law." Secondly, the court held that
the FTC could rely on its own analysis in determining what claims
an advertisement conveys without examining extrinsic evidence, as
long as those claims are reasonably clear from the face of the ad-
vertisement. The court reasoned that extrinsic evidence was not
necessary because "common sense and administrative experience
provide the commission with adequate tools to make its findings."
Finally, the court determined that the advertisements did violate
the Federal Trade Commission Act because it was unlikely that
the average consumer knew that 30% of the calcium was lost in the
processing of the product, and the implication that consumers will
receive five ounces of milk by consuming the product was a mate-
rial misrepresentation.
-M.D.B.
BECHTEL v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 957 F.2D 873
(D.C. CIR. 1992).
The Federal Communications Commission denied licenses to
Galaxy Communications, Inc. and Susan Bechtel for a new FM ra-
dio station and awarded the license to a competitor, Anchor. A ma-
jor factor in the FCC determination was the degree of "integra-
tion" of ownership into management. Both Galaxy and Anchor had
100% integration with the respective owners participating full-
time in the radio station operations, while Bechtel was prepared to
hire outside management. Galaxy alleged that Anchor's proposal
regarding integration was a sham, while Bechtel alleged that the
integration criterion no longer serves its stated objectives of ensur-
ing "greater sensitivity to an area's changing needs."
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that,
in regard to Galaxy's challenge of Anchor's proposal, substantial
deference would be accorded to the FCC's determination, espe-
cially since the Commission's findings of factual and credibility is-
sues were in accord with those of the administrative law judge. The
court then determined that the record supported Anchor's
promises pertaining to integration. Regarding Bechtel's claim, the
court ordered the FCC to respond to Bechtel's challenges and to
consider her application in light of those challenges. The FCC was
instructed to demonstrate why its focus on the integration crite-
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rion is still in the public interest.
-M.D.B.
ALEXANDER V. THORNBURGH, 943 F.2D 825 (8TH CIR. 1991).
Ferris J. Alexander, Sr., defendant, was in the adult entertain-
ment business for over thirty years, showing movies, selling
magazines and selling and leasing video cassettes. It was shown at
his criminal trial that he had consolidated many of his various the-
ater and bookstore businesses under corporation titles, and substi-
tuted names of his employees as a front to conduct his businesses.
None of these corporations filed income tax returns, and two of the
corporations were used to purchase another bookstore and real es-
tate. It was estimated that Alexander underreported his 1982 gross
receipts by $1,322,135 and by $1,416,883 in 1983. In addition, the
trial jury found four magazines and three videos from his business
to be obscene.
Alexander was convicted on 24 counts of a 41 count indict-
ment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota for
tax offenses, obscenity offenses, and Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) violations. He was sentenced to 36-72
months of imprisonment, fined well in excess of $100,000, and or-
dered to forfeit his interest in ten pieces of real estate acquired
from the proceeds of his racketeering activity. Alexander appealed
the conviction, the fines, and the forfeiture on the basis that:
(1)the indictment alleged and the evidence showed, if anything,
multiple conspiracies and not one conspiracy to defraud the
IRS;
(2)the count was defective because it charged a general conspir-
acy rather than a conspiracy to violate a specific statute;
(3)the jury's verdicts on the transportation of obscene materials
counts were inconsistent;
(4)the application of the forfeiture provisions of RICO were un-
constitutional because they criminalized non-obscene expressive
material, violated the First and Eighth Amendments, and the
obscenity standards violated his due process rights;
(5)there was insufficient evidence on all counts to sustain the
verdict below; and,
(6)the District Court should not have entered a summary judg-
ment against him in his civil suit against the government chal-
lenging the use of obscenity as a predicate to RICO on First
Amendment grounds.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Alexander's
conviction on all counts. The court held that whether a conspiracy
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